

# Determining the Fundamental Basis of Software Vulnerabilities

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# Agenda


- Background
  - Analogous background
  - Matt Bishop work
  - CWEs
  - Tool reporting of CWEs
  - KDM Analytics
- Determining the fundamental basis

# Elements of the world

- Classical elements in Babylonia (~17 B.C.): Sea, Earth, Fire, Sky and Wind
- Greek Classical Elements:
  - Four terrestrial elements: Earth, Water, Air and Fire
  - Sometimes a fifth element, Aether, was added
    - Aether is “pure, fresh air” or “clear sky”
  - Persisted throughout the middle ages
- Now viewed as a simplistic view of the world


# More modern view

- Basic building blocks of matter
  - Atoms
    - Protons, neutrons, electrons
  - Elementary particles
    - Quarks, leptons, bosons



# Periodic Table of Chemical Elements

Presented by the number of protons in the atom's nucleus



**WHAT ARE THE ELEMENTARY  
BUILDING BLOCKS OF SOFTWARE  
VULNERABILITIES?**

# “Vulnerabilities Analysis”

- M. Bishop, “Vulnerabilities Analysis,” *Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection* pp. 125–136 (Sep. 1999).
- Goal was to develop a classification scheme for vulnerabilities
- Scheme is deterministic
  - Each class has exactly one property
  - “yes” or “no” answer for membership
- Classification based on the code, environment or other technical details
  - Social cause is not a valid class
- Seeking consistent classification

# Data and Stack Buffer Overflow Breakdown (Bishop)

- A buffer overflow attack can be decomposed into primitive conditions that must exist for the attack to succeed
- Stop any of the primitive conditions and the attack cannot succeed
- Four primitive conditions in *fingerd* attack on Unix system
  - C1. Failure to check bounds when copying data into a buffer.
  - C2. Failure to prevent the user from altering the return address.
  - C3. Failure to check that the input data was of the correct form (user name or network address).
  - C4. Failure to check the type of the words being executed (data loaded, not instructions).



# Invalidating these conditions prevents the exploitation (Bishop)

- C1'. If the attacker cannot overflow the bounds, the control flow will continue in the text (instruction) space and not shift to the loaded data.
- C2'. If the return address cannot be altered, then even if the input overflows the bounds, the control flow will resume at the correct place.
- C3'. As neither a user name nor a network address is a valid sequence of machine instructions on most UNIX systems, this would cause a program crash and not a security breach.
- C4'. If the system cannot execute data, the return into the stack will cause a fault. (Some vendors have implemented this negation, so data on the stack cannot be executed. However, data in the heap can be, leaving them vulnerable to attack.)

# Common Weakness Enumeration (MITRE)

- Dictionary of software weaknesses
- Amalgamation of over a dozen taxonomies
  - CLASP, PLOVER, Pernicious Kingdoms, etc.
- Approximately 807 weaknesses or weakness categories described
- Example: CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
  - The program copies an input buffer to an output buffer without verifying that the size of the input buffer is less than the size of the output buffer, leading to a buffer overflow.

# Reporting of CWEs

- Consider:

```
1 /* Stack Overflow */
2 #define BUFSIZE 256
3 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
4     char buf[BUFSIZE];
5     strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
6 }
```
- Is the vulnerability:
  - CWE-121 Stack based Buffer Overflowor
  - CWE-20 Improper Input Validation?

# Software Fault Patterns

- Pilot by DoD, NIST and DHS
  - Develop a specification of software vulnerabilities that enables automation
  - Looked at subset of CWEs that could potentially be automated
    - Those that can be formalized
    - 302 CWEs
  - Clustered 302 CWEs into 50 software fault patterns
  - Developed whitebox definitions of a small number of CWEs
  - Formalization (machine readable) of 18 CWEs
  - Side effect of work identified a set of 81 Vulnerability Fundamentals

# Fundamental Vulnerabilities

- Fundamental Vulnerability (FV) – A primitive condition in software that can serve as the basis for exploitation of the software
- FVs are defined in the format of a statement of fact
- An FV is the root cause of a software exploitation
- One or more FVs need to be exploited in order for an attack to occur
- An attack can be disrupted if one or more in a series of FVs is removed

# Consider Buffer Overflow

- C1 (Bishop). Failure to check bounds when copying data into a buffer.
- FV: Check of array bounds before array access does not exist or is faulty
- C2 (Bishop). Failure to prevent the user from altering the return address.
- FV: Direct access to a memory address is permitted (can use/alter address of memory to access memory)
- C3 (Bishop). Failure to check that the input data was of the correct form (user name or network address).
- FV: Input checks do not exist or are faulty
- C4 (Bishop). Failure to check the type of the words being executed (data loaded, not instructions).
- FV: Code and data are indistinguishable in memory (commands are treated as data)

# A Buffer Overflow Cannot Occur if...

- If a check of array bounds is performed correctly before the access
  - FV: Check of array bounds before array access does not exist or is faulty
- If memory addresses cannot be directly accessed or altered
  - FV: Direct access to a memory address is permitted (can use/alter address of memory to access memory)
- If input is validated correctly
  - FV: Input checks do not exist or are faulty
- If code and data is segregated in memory
  - FV: Code and data are indistinguishable in memory (commands are treated as data)

# CWEs and FVs

- CWE-369 Divide by Zero
  - FV: Check that divisor is not 0 before division is performed does not exist or is faulty
- CWE-732 Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
  - FV: Check of permissions do not exist or are faulty
- CWE-561 Dead Code
  - FV: Code exists in a program that is not on any execution path



# FVs Rooted in Language Structure

- FV: There is a duality of a string and a null terminated array
- FV: There is syntactic ambiguity in the language
- FV: Signed and unsigned data types are converted from one the other
- FV: There is a disconnect between a pointer and the resource that it represents

# FVs Across a Variety of Languages

- FV: Input checks do not exist or are faulty
- FV: Return value check does not exist or is faulty
- FV: Variable is used before it is initialized
- FV: Binary compilation is not functionally equivalent to its source
- FV: Hardware is not standardized
  - size of short, int, long differ between platforms

# FVs Interaction with Environment

- FV: Security check is not performed local to the application
  - Security check is performed on client for a server application
- FV: Interface with another language is inconsistent

# FVs Resource Interaction

- FV: Ownership of a resource expires
  - Memory containing sensitive information can then be read by some other program
- FV: History and provenance is not available for use at authentication points
  - No basis for determining the integrity of dynamically linked resource
- FV: Race condition for shared resource exists

# Current Status

- About 70 FVs have been identified
- List has been mapped against the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors
- List is still being refined and expanded

Thank you.