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Reliably Determining Data Leakage in the Presence of Strong Attackers
In contrast, our work presents an approach capable of determining the data leakage using a distributed log that securely records all accesses to the data without relying on trusted hardware, and which is not all-or-nothing. We demonstrate our approach to guarantee secure and reliable evidence against even strongest adversaries capable of taking complete control over a machine. For the concrete application of client-server authentication, we show the preciseness of our approach, that it is feasible in practice, and that it can be integrated with existing services.
Author(s):
Riccardo Bortolameotti
University of Twente
Netherlands
Andreas Peter
University of Twente
Netherlands
Maarten H. Everts
TNO; University of Twente
Netherlands
Willem Jonker
University of Twente and EIT Digital
Netherlands
Pieter Hartel
University of Twente
Netherlands