



# On the Detection of Image-Scaling Attacks in Machine Learning

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- ▶ Natural Languages
  - ▶ Preprocess text to make it suitable for ML
  - ▶ Examples: Tokenization, lowercase conversion, stemming, stop word removal


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
Unfortunately, preprocessing brings a new attack surface

→ “Adversarial Preprocessing” [Quiring et al., Usenix Sec'20]


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


## Image-Scaling Attacks

- ▶ Manipulated image changes appearance after downscaling


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- ▶ Both goals must be achieved:  $T \simeq D$  and  $S \simeq A$

# Threat Scenario in Machine Learning


*Possible attacks*

Quiring and Rieck 2020, Xiao et al. 2019

# Threat Scenario in Machine Learning

## *Possible attacks*

- ▶ False predictions at test time





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## *Possible attacks*

- ▶ False predictions at test time
  
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



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
## *Capabilities and knowledge*

- ▶ Attack is agnostic to learning model, data, features
- ▶ Knowledge of scaling algorithm only needed

Quiring and Rieck 2020, Xiao et al. 2019

## Root-Cause of Scaling Attack (Simplified)

Source Image  $S$




Output Image  $D$





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
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


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
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


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


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





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
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## Scaling Attack Example



# Scaling Attack Example



# Defenses

Two defense strategies

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- ▶ **Prevention:** Implement robust scaling by design
- ▶ **Detection:** Find out that an attack is going on [**This work**]

#### *Reasons:*

- ▶ Be able to scan image collections or to identify attacker
- ▶ Robust scaling is slower than vulnerable scaling
- ▶ Detection necessary for proprietary learning systems

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


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
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(a) Unmodified image  $S$

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
- ▶ **Paradigm:** Analyze frequency spectrum of image
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- ▶ Recall root cause: Attack injects pixels in periodic distance
- ▶ Thus, attack causes unique, periodic frequency peaks




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(a) Unmodified image  $S$



(b) Attack image  $A$


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
### Variant 1: Adversarial-Signal Driven




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### Variant 1: Adversarial-Signal Driven



### Variant 2: Clean-Signal Driven



## Paper Contribution: Detection of Scaling Attacks (Continued)

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


## Paper Contribution: Detection of Scaling Attacks (Continued)

- ▶ First in-depth systematization and analysis of detection
- ▶ Two general paradigms identified
- ▶ Novel detection methods for these paradigms
- ▶ Comprehensive evaluation
  - ▶ In total, 19 detection methods compared
  - ▶ Diverse modification scenarios (full, overlay, or just local image modification)
  - ▶ Varying setups:
    - ▶ Multiple learning platforms & scaling algorithms
    - ▶ ImageNet with varying images & scaling ratios
    - ▶ Static & adaptive adversaries

## Some Key Results (1/2)

### Global scenario




### Local scenario




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## Some Key Results (2/2)

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### **Recommendation: Use Ensemble**

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  - ▶ Image-scaling attacks in computer vision
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See *No more Reviewer #2: Subverting Automatic Paper-Reviewer Assignment using Adversarial Learning*, Eisenhofer, Quiring, et al., Usenix Sec'23



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- ▶ This work:
  - ▶ First in-depth systematization and analysis of detection
  - ▶ Efficient detection of scaling attacks possible
  - ▶ Ensemble of varying paradigms necessary

## References I

- [1] Erwin Quiring, David Klein, Daniel Arp, Martin Johns, and Konrad Rieck. “Adversarial Preprocessing: Understanding and Preventing Image-Scaling Attacks in Machine Learning”. In: *Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium*. 2020.
- [2] Erwin Quiring and Konrad Rieck. “Backdooring and Poisoning Neural Networks with Image-Scaling Attacks”. In: *Deep Learning and Security Workshop (DLS)*. 2020.
- [3] Qixue Xiao, Yufei Chen, Chao Shen, Yu Chen, and Kang Li. “Seeing is Not Believing: Camouflage Attacks on Image Scaling Algorithms”. In: *Proc. of USENIX Security Symposium*. 2019.