The Queen's Guard: A Secure Enforcement of Fine-grained Access Control In Distributed Data Analytics Platforms - SecureDL

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Agenda

- Opportunities and contribution
- > Threat model
- Background Apache Spark
- IRM based access control "add-on" security
- Attacks on IRM based solution
- Defense against these attacks
 - Proactive and reactive
- Evaluation results


Opportunities and Contribution

- Apache Spark
 - Doesn't have built in fine-grained security
- "add-on" security solutions are inadequate
 - We show attacks using invasive system API
- Propose two layer defense mechanisms
- Propose fully customizable access control with masks and filters

Threat Model

- Attacker's aim: Evade fine-grained
- ▷ Is an **insider** in multi-tier organization
 - Has lower privilege
 - Can run code for data-analytics
- Has incentive to evade ACL
 - Especially if chance of getting caught is low
- Real world use cases
 - <u>Criminals Increasing SIM Swap Schemes to Steal Millions of</u> <u>Dollars from US Public</u>
 - Spotlight on Insider Fraud in the Financial Services Industry

Background - Spark Job Execution



Background - Spark Programming


spark.read.json("accounts.json")

- .filter(r -> r.state == "TX")
- .groupBy("zip").agg(mean("rewards"))

.collect()

Program to read a json file, filter rows, and aggregate

- After code submission the code gets translated into RDD (Resilient Distributed Dataset)
- It is lazy evaluated, until necessary computation won't happen




RDD

Access Control using AOP / IRM

@Around("execution(* org.apache.spark.sql.DataFrameReader.json(...))") def policisOnJsonFile(joinPoint): file path <- joinPoint.getArgs[0]</pre> Check user has access to the file u <- fetch user info()</pre> if (!hasAccess(u, file path)) Execute the JSON reading function throw new AccessControlException () } Add a map() and a filter() functions to add data masks and filters based on admin defined policies rdd <- joinPoint.proceed()</pre> return enforce policies (file path, u, rdd)

Aspect Oriented Programming based implementation to enforce policy on json file

RDD after policy enforcement



- After the policy enforcement the RDD have additional filter and map
- Filter function is used to remove rows that user doesn't have access to
 - e.g. User1 don't have access to accounts with zip 75080
- Map function is used for modifying content of a data
 - e.g. mask all but last 4 digits of credit card
- Added filter and map gets distributed
- Similar to GuardMR, Vigiles

RDD

Policy - Encoded in Yaml

```
Policy:
Masks:
   phone:
                                               customer accounts:
                                                 document: customers.accounts
     name: PhoneNumberMask
     type: regex mask
                                                filter:
     detection regex: >
                                                   val ip : String = context("ip")
          ((2) d{3}))?(-|) d{3}-d{4}"
                                                  val z : Integer = row("zip")
     replacement pattern: '***-***-dddd'
                                                   if(ip == "10.5.17.10") {
                                                     z >= 75080 \setminus \& \setminus \& z <= 75081
   14of12d:
     type: static mask
                                                   } else {
     data type: digit
                                                       false
     length: 12
                                                   }
     name: ShowLast40f12Digits
     visible anchor: end
                                                masks:
     visible chars: 4
                                                   credit card:
                                                     - Masks.14of12d
                                                   comments:
                                                     - Masks.phone
```

Attack Surfaces on IRM based Solution

```
val rd = sc.textFile("users.csv")
```

val clazz = rd.getClass

// #3. Read with "parent" method

val mthd = clazz.getMethod("parent", 0)

```
val initParent = mthd.invoke(rd, ...)
```

```
// #1. Read with "prev" field
val fld = clazz.getDeclaredField("prev") // #4. Read with "firstParent" method
fld.setAccessible(true) val method =
val parent = fld.get(rd) clazz.getMethod("firstParent")
val initParent = fld.get(parent) val initParent = method.invoke(rd, ...)
```

```
// #2. Read with "prev" method // Accessing the parent pointer
val method = clazz.getMethod("prev") // with "parent" method
val parent = method.invoke(rd) val parent = rdd.parent(0)
val initParent = method.invoke(parent)
```

Apache Spark - Attack Surfaces

- Restricting reflection on RDDs.
- Preventing framework-specific package declarations.
- Preventing dynamic class loading.
- Preventing to override security managers.
- Preventing native codes and libraries.

SecureDL - System Architecture




Figure 2: System overview of our policy enforcement in Apache Spark with proactive and reactive defenses. Here proactive agents, reactive agents, policy dispatchers, and filter caching are the new components proposed in SECUREDL.

Defense - Proactive

Use program analysis (static analysis) to block

- Framework specific package declaration
- Restrict permissive System API
 - Dynamic classloading
 - Security Manager overriding
 - Native code/library loading
- > These can be invasive in some cases
 - Implemented allowlisting mechanism

Defense - Proactive

- Use program analysis (backward dataflow) to detect reflection API usages
 - Track use of java.lang.Object get(java.lang.Object) and java.lang.Object invoke(java.lang.Object,java.lang.Object[])
 - Especifically if RDD instance is first parameter to this
 - Note: JavaSecurityManager can't protect against get or invoke calls

Utilized <u>CryptoGuard</u>





Figure 1: Blocking the use of reflection on RDD objects. Here, $v_i \rightsquigarrow p_o$ represents an influence of an object v_i on the program point p_o . V represents the set of all such objects.

Defense - Reactive

- Enable a Security Manager that restricts method calls
 - o accessDeclaredMembers
 - suppressAccessChecks
 - o newProxyInPackage
- Analyze call trace to
 - find if a call generated from user submitted code

Evaluation - Access Control Overhead

RQ: What is the overhead of policy enforcement?



- Policy overhead is highly policy dependent
- Average overhead 4% on TPCH query with masking policy
- Paper contains many more experimental results

Evaluation - Proactive Analyzer

RQ: What are the common proactively detectable issues in spark programs in the wild?

- Collected 2120 spark repositories from GitHub
- 637 were built using maven
- 417 were successfully built
- Found 247 analyzable jars
 - Exclude uber-jars
- Found some issues in 21 jars
 - 12 jars had org.apache package
 - 7 jars use Class.forName
 - 8 jars has networking calls

Questions?

Contacts

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