OAuth 2.0 Redirect URI Validation Falls Short
OAuth 2.0 requires a complex redirection trail between websites and Identity Providers (IdPs). In particular, the ""redirect URI"" pa- rameter included in the popular Authorization Grant Code flow governs the callback endpoint that users are routed to, together with their security tokens. The protocol specification, therefore, includes guidelines on protecting the integrity of the redirect URI. In this work, we analyze the OAuth 2.0 specification in light of modern systems-centric attacks and reveal that the prescribed redirect URI validation guidance exposes IdPs to path confusion and parameter pollution attacks. Based on this observation, we propose novel attack techniques and experiment with 16 popular IdPs, empirically verifying that the OAuth 2.0 security guidance is under-specified. We finally present end-to-end attack scenarios that combine our attack techniques with common web application vulnerabilities, ultimately resulting in a complete compromise of the secure delegated access that OAuth 2.0 promises.